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1 Introduction
Keynes famously noted that Marshall knit in wool. Mehrdad Vahabi’s
paper congenially maintains that style. As I largely agree with what Va-
habi has outlined in his nice paper, it may be useful, as a matter of con-
trast, to look at Marshall’s concept of normality from a less congenial,
if not alien, perspective. This is what I propose to do.
I feel that this is appropriate, because my knowledge of Marshall is
more limited than that of a number of persons in this audience. Although
I have employed some of Marshall’s ideas in some of my own work, and
my knowledge is constrained to a limited set topics. So my contribution
will be, and can only be, to comment on the topic of normality from my
rather specific perspective. I shall be slightly more analytic than Mehrdad
Vahabi, however, in an attempt to debunk the “Cambridge didactic style”
– so much endorsed by Marshall – that lavishes an appearance of triv-
iality on even the deepest insight. Marshallians may appreciate that, but
others are sometimes simply vexed.
2 Normality as Lawfulness
Marshall (1890, I.III.4) conceived the concept of “normality” as equiva-
lent to “following a law that relates a cause with an effect.” In order to
avoid legal overtones, however, he preferred “normality” over “governed
by a law”:
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Corresponding to the substantive "law" is the adjective "legal." But
this term is used only in connection with "law" in the sense of an or-
dinance of government; not in connection with "law" in the sense of
a statement of relation between cause and effect. The adjective used
for this purpose is derived from "norma," a term which is nearly
equivalent to "law," and might perhaps with advantage be substi-
tuted for it in scientific discussions.
Marshall’s concept of normality refers, thus, to states of affairs where
laws are obeyed.
3 Economic Laws as Laws of Tendency
Economic laws, however, are not conceived as laws that fit the facts in
any direct manner:
The term "law" means then nothing more than a general proposition
or statement of tendencies, more or less certain, more or less definite.
(ibid.)
In other words, economic laws describe tendencies rather than warrant
any perfect fit of actual phenomena with some statement of regularity.
4 Normality and Equilibrium
In his Principles, Marshall analyzes economic laws, as describing ten-
dencies, mostly in equilibrium terms. Economic equilibria (always con-
ceived as moving equilibria) are states toward things are tending.1
In equilibrium, each set of forces balances with some corresponding
counter-forces. Out of equilibrium, the forces that push toward equi-
librium are stronger than their counter-forces, and a tendency toward
equilibrium obtains. The market example makes that clear:
When . . . the demand price is greater than the supply price, then
sellers receive more than is sufficient to make it worth their while to
bring goods to market to that amount; and there is at work an ac-
tive force tending to increase the amount brought forward for sale.
1 Marshall 1890, V.III.6. Note that this differs from the Walrasian equilibrium (market
clearing), expectational equilibrium (ex ante = ex post), game theoretic equilibrium (each
strategy being a best reply to the others), or analytic equilibrium (critical point of a
dynamical system); see Schlicht (1982; 1985, 27 f.).
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On the other hand, when the amount produced is such that the de-
mand price is less than the supply price, sellers receive less than is
sufficient to make it worth their while to bring goods to market on
that scale; so that . . . there is an active force at work tending to
diminish the amount brought forward for sale. When the demand
price is equal to the supply price, the amount produced has no ten-
dency either to be increased or to be diminished; it is in equilibrium.
(Marshall 1890, V.III.6).
While Vahabi’s paper includes interesting observations on the relation
between competition and normality, he may think of including more on
the relationship between normality and equilibrium.
5 The Theoretical Concept
As Vahabi notes, normality is a ceteris paribus concept, just as equilib-
rium is: Normality is always conceived under certain conditions. With
given technology, tastes, and incomes, a particular price may be con-
ceived as normal – the equilibrium price. If tastes, or technology, or
incomes change, the equilibrium price will change accordingly. We may
try to understand the movements of the observed price by linking it to
the moving normal price. The observed price will trail the normal price
like a missile trails its moving target. Knowing the movement of the tar-
get, and the tendency of the missile to close in or the target, enables us
to understand the movement of the missile, and likewise for the actual
price. This is the essence of Marshall’s moving equilibrium method.1
The point is here, however, that the equilibrium may never be reached
since time is required for the underlying causes to work out their effects,
but
meanwhile the material on which they work, and perhaps even the
causes themselves, may have changed; and the tendencies which are
being described will not have a sufficiently "long run" in which to
work themselves out fully. (Marshall 1890, I.III.5.)
Hence I agree with Vahabi that “normal” and “average” price are dif-
ferent things, but I am somewhat at a loss to decide whether normality,
so conceived, is “predictive,” as Vahabi’s reference to Kornai suggests.
This may depend on how we use the term, predictive.
1 see Schlicht (1985, Ch. 3; 1997).
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The theoretical nature of the concept is highlighted by another
thought, related to what I have termed the “Principle of Hicks-
d’Alembert.” (Schlicht 1982; 1985, 45 f.). Consider a falling stone. As
long as it has not reached the ground, we may conceive it as not being
in equilibrium, viz. having not attained its normal position of lying inert
on the lawn. Yet while falling, its speed is determined by an equilibrium
between the force of gravity that pulls it down, the force of inertia that
opposes acceleration, and air resistance that opposes movement. If air
resistance were smaller, the stone would fall faster, for instance. In this
sense, the stone can be considered as always being in equilibrium, and
hence in its “normal” state – even if still falling. Its acceleration will be
determined such that resisting and propelling forces balance. In physics,
this is known as “d’Alembert’s Principle.”
The same may be said about economic quantities: If a price moves
with a certain speed, this is the case because obstacles prevent it from
moving faster. Hence the same price movement may be conceived as an
approach from disequilibrium to normal equilibrium (if we disregard the
determination of speed) or as always in normal equilibrium (if we include
the determinants of speed).
In consequence, normality is a theoretical concept: What is normal
depends on the model chosen. As far as I see, Marshall was aware of
that problem but was concerned that theory may all too easily detach
from reality, and he worked against that danger by endowing even his
theoretical concepts with a “realistic” touch.
6 Some Grumble
As a consequence of the above interpretation, and notwithstanding gen-
eral agreement, I feel some uneasiness with some of Valhabi’s state-
ments.
Expectations. Vahabi suggests that Marshallian normality differs
from some Neo-Ricardian center of gravity because expectations play a
role. I tend to disagree because (as Valhabi correctly points out) Mar-
shallian normality refers to aggregates, too. Yet aggregates do not pos-
sess any conscience of their own and it does not make sense to attribute
expectations to aggregates.
Further, we may think of a Marshallian equilibrium between bulls and
bears on the stock market, where the optimists just balance the pessimists,
as in Keynes. Under these circumstances, it does not make sense to
talk about fullfilled expectations, as we have contradictory expectations,
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which cannot all simultaneously be satisfied.1
Ex ante and ex post. By the same token, Marshall seems to me not
to fit easily into any kind of ex ante-ex post schema, if this is meant to
refer to the difference between planned and realized quantities, because
an aggregate cannot make plans, and plans of sundry individuals cannot
usefully be aggregated into some kind of macro plan. It may be of interest
to note that Keynes was rather skeptical regarding the ex ante-ex post
juxtaposition and did not embrace it (Robertson 1955, 476). I am not
sufficiently an expert on Marshall, but Valhabi has not yet convinced
me that Keynes deviated from his teacher in this respect. It appears to
me that recasting Marshall in ex ante-ex post terms is akin to re-framing
Marshall in game-theoretic terms. It could be done, but nevertheless
appears strange to me. What would be the possible use of doing so?
This remark does not, of course, minimize the importance of expecta-
tions, neither in Keynes, nor in Marshall. There cannot be any doubt
that both heroes emphasized them greatly. But this emphasis refers to the
subject-matter of economic theory, rather than to the concept of normality
which does, after all, not relate to anything specific. It relates to form,
rather than substance. It is a theoretical concept.
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